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This Article—written for a symposium hosted by the William & Mary Bill of
Rights Journal—focuses on the efforts by the Trump administration to relocate
federal officials outside of Washington to reduce the capacity of the federal govern-
ment. Federalism and the separation of powers are usually the twin pillars of
structural constitutional law.1 Locating federal officials outside of Washington—
federal decentralization—has been an additional tool of diffusing power that has
started to gain some scholarly attention.2 These debates largely focus on structural
constitutional law as constructive—as improving the capacity and operation of the
federal and state governments.3 The power to diffuse becomes the power to democ-
ratize because more types of officials subject to more types of forces are empow-
ered. There is another means of viewing these principles: as destructive rather than
constructive.4 The power to diffuse becomes the power to destroy.
The Trump administration used federal decentralization in this destructive way.
It attempted to reduce the number of officials who know how the federal government
operates, with only minimal benefits in return.5 In the shorter term, these destructive
efforts will be costly to reverse, thereby disabling important federal offices. In the
longer term, it means that federal decentralization will not be associated with the
Federal Reserve Bank or the lower federal courts, but with “drain the swamp.”6
* Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law, George Washington University School of
Law. My thanks to Tara Grove and the editors of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
for their invitation to the symposium and for persisting with the symposium even in the midst
of a pandemic.
1 See David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, 104 VA. L. REV. 727, 729 (2018).
2 See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Fontana, supra note 1, at 729–35.
4 See Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLAL.REV. 58, 91–92 (2016)
(discussing a study of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ decentralized regulatory program
and the effectiveness of its implementation).
5 See David Fontana, Trump Administration Drains the Swamp the Wrong Way, CNN
(June 24, 2019, 8:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/24/opinions/trump-decentralizing
-government-wrong-way-fontana/index.html [https://perma.cc/PW39-LW2L].
6 See id. (highlighting the association between “drain the swamp” and “decentralizing
the operations of the federal government by spreading its officials more widely around the
country”).
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional law is often divided, broadly speaking, into two big categories: rights
and structure.7 The constitutional law of rights addresses the relationship between
individuals and their federal or state governments, while structural constitutional law
addresses the relationship between federal and state institutions of government.8
Federalism and the separation of powers are the twin pillars of structural constitu-
tional law.9 James Madison described these principles as combining together to
provide “double security” safeguarding the American constitutional experiment.10
Scholars have responded to Madison’s view and debated the various forms of security
these two principles provide and which forms matter more or less.11
Locating federal officials outside of Washington has been an additional tool of
diffusing power for several hundred years.12 The President and the Congress were
purposefully located in separate parts of Washington when the capital was moved
there so that they would “eye each other with Constitutionally ordained respect and
7 This bifurcation goes at least as far back as the debate at the Founding regarding the
necessity for a bill of rights given a Constitution identifying the basic structure of government.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513–15 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they
are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would even be
dangerous. They would contain various exceptions . . . .”).
8 For a discussion of how the American republic’s federal system divides power and
provides checks between the state and the federal government, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 51,
at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
9 See id.; see also Fontana, supra note 1, at 735.
10 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 8, at 323 (James Madison).
11 For a discussion of the current literature and what the author considered an additional,
largely neglected security consideration, see Fontana, supra note 1, at 729.
12 See id. at 730–31.
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suspicion.”13 More than two hundred years later, regional banks of the Federal Reserve
Bank,14 lower federal courts,15 and even the Centers for Disease Control count as
important parts of the federal government located outside of Washington.16 Scholars
in the past few years have started to focus on this federal decentralization as an im-
portant dimension of structural constitutional law.17
These debates largely focus on structural constitutional law as constructive—as
improving the capacity and operation of the federal and state governments.18 The
power to diffuse becomes the power to democratize because more types of officials,
subject to more types of forces, are empowered.19 There is another means of viewing
these principles: as destructive rather than constructive. The power to diffuse becomes
the power to destroy.
Destructive structural constitutional law has shorter- and longer-term effects. In
the shorter term, destructive efforts are costly to reverse. Reallocating power among
federal and state governments is difficult to achieve because of the many procedural
and political barriers characterizing the American system.20 The bad policy will be
the harm that keeps on giving, because it is difficult to undo the harm.
In the longer term, destructive efforts constitute a form of unilateral constitu-
tional (mis)appropriation. These efforts are usually highly salient, and therefore
widely known.21 Their destructive nature makes them provocative and polarizing.22
13 FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, WASHINGTON: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CAPITAL 226
(2008).
14 See, e.g., Sarah Binder & Mark Spindel, Monetary Politics: Origins of the Federal
Reserve, 27 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 1–2 (2013) (discussing the creation of regional banks);
see also H.R. REP. No. 63-69, at 12 (1913) (“In the United States, with its immense area,
numerous natural divisions, still more numerous competing divisions, and abundant outlets
to foreign countries, there is no argument either of banking theory or of expediency which
dictates the creation of a single central banking institution, no matter how skillfully managed,
how carefully controlled, or how patriotically conducted.”).
15 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (creating geographically defined
lower federal courts).
16 See Our History—Our Story, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www
.cdc.gov/about/history/ourstory.html [https://perma.cc/D6F5-N6EA] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
17 For some examples, see generally Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal
Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1895 (2018); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 377 (2018); Fontana, supra note 1; David Fontana, The Narrowing of Federal
Power by the American Political Capital, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 733 (2015) [here-
inafter Fontana, The Narrowing of Federal Power]; David Fontana, Placing the Government
in Fragile Democracies, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985 (2015); Owen, supra note 4.
18 See sources cited supra note 17.
19 See Fontana, The Narrowing of Federal Power, supra note 17, at 729.
20 See Fontana, supra note 1, at 743–45 (discussing early debates to decentralize the
federal government).
21 See id. at 731.
22 See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV.
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The end result is that one political party is widely known as the supporter of the
structural principle that was used for destructive ends, and the other political party
becomes excessively opposed to the principle.23 The debate about these principles
becomes unduly political and pointless.24 The party opposed to the principle fails to
leverage the principle for their own desired ends.25
It is a separate question why officials might pursue policies that are less construc-
tive and more destructive. Sometimes it might be accidental. Other times it might
be more in bad faith.26 These efforts are often done for reasons other than a concern
for structural constitutional law, so such efforts usually feature a lack of candor.27
While there has been substantial focus on how the administration of President
Donald J. Trump (mis)handled federalism and separation of powers, there has been
little meaningful discussion of how it handled federal decentralization.28 Its allies in
Congress proposed relocating ninety percent of Washington officials in the next few
years.29 Its leaders in the executive branch successfully relocated important officials
to Grand Junction, Colorado and Kansas City, Missouri.30
These efforts were broad in their nature but singular in their focus: they were an
attempt to undermine existing federal officials in Washington, without any reason
to believe they would provide the benefits that follow from successful efforts at
869, 870–71 (1993) (discussing how the two prominent American political parties tend to
take opposite views on important issues).
23 See id. at 871 (“[L]egal ideas and symbols will change their political valence as they
are used over and over again in new contexts. This description envisions an idea or symbol
changing its political significance over time while its content is held constant. Nevertheless,
we know that meaning is equally dependent on context.”).
24 See id. at 872–73.
25 See, e.g., id. at 874.
26 For a landmark treatment of these issues, see generally David E. Pozen, Constitutional
Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 886 (2016). Bad faith can have an objective component
focused “on the fairness or reasonableness” of the conduct. Id. at 893. It can also have a
subjective component focused on “the use of deception to conceal or obscure a material fact,
a malicious purpose, or an improper motive or belief.” Id. at 892.
27 For a brilliant discussion of these concepts, see Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity,
94 VA. L. REV. 987, 992 (2008) (“Sincerity, on this view, requires correspondence between
what people say, what they intend to say, and what they believe.”). This author further asserts
that “[e]ven a speaker who means what she says may not say everything necessary for her
to be considered candid.” Id. at 994.
28 See, e.g., Ross K. Baker, Donald Trump’s Laissez Faire Federalism Is as Toxic as
Covid-19, USATODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/07/14/donald-trump
-federalism-coronavirus-covid-19-response-column/5424862002/ [https://perma.cc/5WBF
-RASM] (July 14, 2020, 7:00 AM); Terry Carter, The Executive Branch Pushes the Boundaries
of the Separation of Powers, ABAJ. (Apr. 1, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.abajournal.com
/magazine/article/imbalance_of_power_executive_branch [https://perma.cc/U3CM-PB45].
29 See H.R. 826, 115th Cong. (2017).
30 See generally infra Part III (discussing decentralization by the Trump administration).
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federal decentralization.31 In the near future, this means that important offices of the
federal government have lost talented people that even a later, sympathetic adminis-
tration will have a difficult time rehiring. In the longer term, it means that federal
decentralization will not be associated with the Federal Reserve Bank or the lower
federal courts, but with “drain the swamp.”32
I. CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Passions about constitutional rights often run deep and motivate public officials
to take action to protect or limit these rights.33 Structural constitutional law is different.
Structural constitutional law is more often a means to another end. Even controver-
sial constitutional disputes surrounding structural issues are controversial because they
ultimately appear to be about rights and not structure.34 This means that evaluating
efforts to diffuse power often involves assessing incidental or side effects rather than
main effects.35 And an incidental or side effect can sometimes make the federal
government worse off, rather than better off.
A. The Categories
Federalism and the separation of powers are broad principles encompassing many
discrete textual rules and doctrinal trajectories.36 Each principle has been presented
31 For a description of some national systems that have used decentralization successfully
in their countries, see Fontana, supra note 1, at 758–59.
32 See Fontana, supra note 5.
33 For instance, by deciding in Planned Parenthood v. Casey to reaffirm the “essential
holding” of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court made it clear that problematic future regulations
would be those that had “the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877, 880 (1992) (minority and majority opinions) (emphasis added).
34 For an example of this phenomenon, see generally NFIB v. Sebellius, 567 U.S. 519
(2012), which was nominally about the Commerce Clause but really seemed to be more of
a case about rights. See also Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate,
91 B.U.L.REV. 1723, 1725 (2011) (explaining how Affordable Care Act litigation was more
about the claim “that the government lacks authority to regulate certain personal decisions
or actions, because those decisions or actions are for the individual, and only the individual,
to make or take”).
35 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (minority opinion) (stating that the side effect of the
statute in Planned Parenthood v. Casey needed to be analyzed in addition to the primary
focus on unborn life because of the obstacle created “in the path of a woman’s choice”).
36 For helpful criticisms of the breadth of these areas of doctrine, see generally John F.
Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV.L.REV. 1939 (2011)
(discussing “a freestanding separation of powers doctrine” as a problem for judicial
discretion); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2037–45 (2009) (arguing that federalism is also a
broad concept that generates judicial discretion in deciding cases). It is worth noting that
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as improving the capacity of the federal and state governments not in a single way, but
in multiple different ways.37 Some of the goals that these principles are meant to
further can be more desirable than others, or more achievable than others.38 For
instance, some promoting federalism focus more on its potential to empower local
minorities.39 Others focus more on its ability to encourage experimentation.40 One
could be a skeptic of federalism’s capacity to incentivize experimentation,41 but a
believer in federalism’s capacity to incentivize broad participation in government,
or vice versa.42 If one had to trade off among these ambitions of federalism, perhaps
they would prioritize experimentation and sacrifice some participation, or vice versa.
These are disagreements that arise within the concept and the community of those
using structural principles to create and generate governmental capacity to do good
and to do well.43
But structural principles can also be destructive, and destructive enough that some
countries have entirely rejected them.44 Neither federalism nor the separation of powers
even the narrower, clause-bound examples of federalism and the separation of powers are
still presented as furthering broad—but not entirely identical—principles. See Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–46 (1983) (mentioning “the fact that a
given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of govern-
ment” as relevant considerations, but not determinative ones, in interpreting bicameralism
and presentment). This is not just about the level of generality at which these principles are
understood, although it is true that a higher level of generality might make disagreements
broader and deeper.
37 See, e.g., The Constitution’s Basic Principles: Federalism, CONGRESS.GOV: CONST.
ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/intro-2-2-3/ALDE_00000032/
[https://perma.cc/JH24-RWKM] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
38 See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 7 (2010) (“[T]he conventional image of federal-state relations . . . is a model built on
the notion that the best way to protect minorities is to give them an exit option—the chance
to make policy in accord with their own preferences, separate and apart from the center.”).
40 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (“[O]ne of the happy incidents of the federal system [is] that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
41 For great studies in this direction, see Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of
Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333,
1346–61 (2009); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 603–05 (1980).
42 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“This federalist structure of joint
sovereigns . . . assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in demo-
cratic processes . . . .”).
43 See Galle & Leahy, supra note 41, at 1335 (stating federalism’s purpose is to “better
mankind”).
44 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Does Institutional Design Make a Difference?, 109 NW.
See id.
See id. 
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Republicans using federal decentralization can see no wrong in it, and Democrats
can see no right in it. The conversation about its best and worst uses becomes more
political rather than principled.
III. DESTRUCTIVE FEDERAL DECENTRALIZATION IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
The efforts by the Trump administration always appeared to be destructive because
of the words preceding and accompanying them and because of the deeds that were
part of them.149 There was a serious conversation during the presidential and congres-
sional campaign of 2016 about federal decentralization.150 Former Florida Governor Jeb
Bush launched his campaign for the Republican nomination for President (in Miami)
in June of 2015 by declaring that Washington was a “static capital” in a “dynamic
country.”151 He wanted to relocate the Department of the Interior to a city in the West-
ern United States so that it could employ individuals with a different set of skills in
managing federal lands and could hear more from those reliant on federal lands.152
That serious conversation never involved the Trump campaign, which instead
called for “draining the swamp.”153 After the Trump administration came into office,
the ambition of its officials and its supporters to use federal decentralization to
destroy rather than to create became clearer.154 Mick Mulvaney, the acting White
House Chief of Staff, praised one effort to move federal officials as an effort to drain
149 See, e.g., Ben Guarino, USDA Science Agencies’ Relocation May Have Violated Law,
Inspector General Report Says, WASH.POST (Aug. 6, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/science/2019/08/05/usda-science-agencies-relocation-may-have-violated-law
-inspector-general-report-says/ [https://perma.cc/J46E-J83Q].
150 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Gardiner Harris, Trump Wants to ‘Drain the Swamp,’
But Change Will Be Complex and Costly, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/11/11/us/politics/trump-government.html [https://perma.cc/3YZE-5S6Y].
151 See Michael Barbaro & Jonathan Martin, Jeb Bush Announces White House Bid,
Saying “America Deserves Better,” N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com
/2015/06/16/us/politics/jeb-bush-presidential-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/82JR-XREU].
152 See Jeb Bush, Western Land and Resource Management, MEDIUM (Oct. 21, 2015),
https://medium.com/@JebBush/western-land-and-resource-management-e21ae5bce5f
[https://perma.cc/2N2N-7YRT]; Sean Sullivan, Jeb Bush Moves Against Washington Again




153 See Kenneth P. Vogel & Eric Lipton, Recording Shows that the Swamp Has Not Been
Drained, N.Y.TIMES (July 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/26/us/politics/trump
-recording-donors.html [https://perma.cc/76ZK-NLUB] (“It became such a central slogan of
Donald J. Trump’s 2016 campaign that at rallies his supporters would chant the three words
representing his pledge to take on big donors and special interests: ‘Drain the swamp.’”).
154 See, e.g., Guarino, supra note 149.
638 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:619
the swamp by targeting people in the “liberal haven of Washington, D.C.” who did
not care for “the real part of the country.”155
A. Statutory
The various efforts led by President Trump’s supporters in the House of Repre-
sentatives suggested this was an example of destructive federal decentralization.
Republican members of the House of Representatives introduced the “Drain the
Swamp Act of 2017.”156 It would have required “the head of each executive agency”
to relocate “outside of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area” within six years.157
In six years, “no more than 10 percent of the employees of the agency [should be]
based in the Washington metropolitan area.”158
From the perspective of constructing (rather than destroying) expertise, the
statute did far too much to far too many people. It would have substantially undermined
the governmental expertise that existing officials have by requiring the relocations
of hundreds of thousands of them,159 including the most important executive branch
officials. It also gave no clear indications that it would have replaced that expertise
or supplement it with issue-based expertise.160
There are many officials within the executive branch who should remain in
Washington. These officials have expertise related to their social networks in
Washington.161 Their relationships in Washington provide them with information
155 Id.
156 H.R. 826, 115th Cong. (2017).
157 Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
158 Id.
159 There are nearly 600,000 employees—broadly construing the term employees—in the
Washington metropolitan area. See Policy, Data, Oversight: Data, Analysis & Documentation:
Federal Civilian Employment, U.S. OFF. PERS. MGMT. (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter Federal
Civilian Employment], https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documenta
tion/federal-employment-reports/reports-publications/federal-civilian-employment/
[https://perma.cc/JK3R-BQPM] (listing 589,426 annuitants and employees). It is worth noting
that this statute would have affected all federal officials in the Washington metropolitan area,
not just in the District of Columbia:
(A) the District of Columbia
(B) Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties in the State of Maryland; and
(C) Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William Counties and the City of
Alexandria in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
See H.R. 826 § (2)(c)(2).
160 See generally id.
161 For a powerful and important study about how being part of the network of decision-
makers in Washington empowers officials, see CARPENTER, supra note 100, at 14–15. The
quality and quantity of information that a network provides is crucially important. See Mark
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOCIO.THEORY 201,
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about policies enacted or being considered and the politics related to these policies.162
If these officials are relocated outside of Washington, these networks will wither
away,163 as will the quality of information they receive from the networks.164
The proposed statute, though, would have mandated the relocation of precisely
those officials whose greatest comparative advantage is their Washington expertise.165
It mandated that “the head of each executive agency” be out of Washington within
six years.166 That even meant all of those who directed an “[e]xecutive agency,” except
for the President.167 Cabinet secretaries—like other high-level political appointees—
usually have expertise related to how Washington operates rather than how a particular
policy issue should be handled.168 The Secretary of State does not spend hours each
day reading academic papers or country reports. The Secretary knows the range of
private actors and officials in the federal government that need to be united in order to
take meaningful foreign policy action.169 Whether it would have been Hillary Clinton
or Mike Pompeo, relocating them from Washington would have meant that the
network necessary to take action dissipates eventually to the point of disappearance.
More than ten percent of the officials in the executive branch have an expertise
derived from their work in Washington.170 Many of these officials are the thousands
of other political appointees that each President places in important positions in his
administration.171 But others also occupy positions that rely on Washington knowl-
edge. For instance, there are thousands working as civil servants in the Office of
Legislative Affairs of their executive agency or department and navigating the
complicated appropriations process on Capitol Hill.172
204 (1983); Gabriel Weimann, The Strength of Weak Conversational Ties in the Flow of
Information and Influence, 5 SOC. NETWORKS 245, 260–63 (1983).
162 See Fontana, The Narrowing of Federal Power, supra note 17, at 746–50.
163 See Luis M.A. Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling in Cities, 340 SCIENCE 1438, 1439
(2013) (finding that “the average number of local interactions” between people depends on
how physically proximate they are).
164 See Gertler, supra note 113, at 84 (noting that better quality information is provided
more proximately).
165 See H.R. 826; see also Fontana, The Narrowing of Federal Power, supra note 17, at
740, 745.
166 H.R. 826 § 2(b)(1) (emphasis added).
167 Id. § 2(c)(1) (drawing the phrase’s definition from the U.S. Code).
168 See Fontana, supra note 1, at 762, 786–87.
169 See LIGHT, supra note 132, at 106.
170 See Federal Civilian Employment, supra note 159 (noting that 15.12% of federal civil
employees are in the Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV area).
171 See David Fontana, The Permanent and Presidential Transition Models of Political
Party Policy Leadership, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1993, 1997 (2009) (identifying the thousands of
officials that Presidents must select to staff the executive branch); David Fontana, Executive
Branch Legalisms, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 21, 35 (2012) (discussing the many lawyers in the
executive branch who occupy positions partially shaped by the President’s preferences).
172 See, e.g., Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, supra note 171, at 42.
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For both the heads of important parts of the executive branch and the many who
work beneath them, the statute also has no sense of where to relocate these officials
in order to help them work with more technical sophistication. It only mentions the
goal to “maximize any potential cost savings associated with the relocation.”173 If the
goal is to maximize cost savings, then federal officials could be placed in locations
without the labor supply to handle complicated governmental tasks. There are other
metropolitan areas that have a deep bench of federal officials with governmental exper-
tise, not just (or not even) issue expertise.174 For instance, relocating the Secretary
of Defense to Virginia Beach—a notable military town—would surround the Secretary
with thousands of others who have some knowledge of the federal government.175
Because of this, it is hard to evaluate the Drain the Swamp Act as anything other
than an attempt to destroy existing federal officials. Requiring that hundreds of
thousands of federal officials be forced to leave Washington within six years or lose
their positions would result in thousands (or hundreds of thousands) of departures
from the federal government.176 Those with the most experience in the federal
government—including those who would be heads of agencies or departments—will
have the deepest personal and professional connections in Washington and therefore
be the least likely to leave it.
B. Regulatory
While this statute never had a serious chance of being enacted, there were efforts
within the executive branch that were actually implemented. The Trump admin-
istration relocated many officials from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in
Washington to Grand Junction, Colorado.177 BLM employs “10,000 [officials]—97
percent of whom are located in the western United States—[and] manage[s] a portfo-
lio of public lands and resources encompassing more than 245 million surface acres,
primarily located in 12 western states.”178
173 H.R. 826, 115th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(B) (2017).
174 See Richard Florida, America’s Federal Employment Belt, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB
(Nov. 15, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-15/america-s
-federal-employment-belt [https://perma.cc/TG4B-B336].
175 See id.
176 See, e.g., Nathalie Baptiste, The Trump Administration Has Figured out How to Get
Rid of Federal Workers Without Firing Them, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www
.motherjones.com/politics/2019/10/the-trump-administration-has-figured-out-how-to-get-rid
-of-federal-workers-without-firing-them/ [https://perma.cc/8YZ2-X2QM]. After moving the
USDA Economic Research Service to Kansas City, 78% of the employees at the ERS left
the agency all together. Id.
177 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-397R, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGE-
MENT: AGENCY’S REORGANIZATION EFFORTS DID NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ADDRESS KEY
PRACTICES FOR EFFECTIVE REFORMS (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/705175.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WQ9-J9YR].
178 Id.
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BLM was an unusual target for decentralization. While roughly 85% of all
federal officials are located outside of Washington,179 97% of BLM offices are
located outside of Washington.180 Some of the best information we have about the
BLM relocation suggests that 311 career BLM officials were relocated outside of
Washington and sixty remained in Washington.181 This means that less than 1% of
BLM officials remain in Washington.182
Of these 311 relocated outside of Washington, fifty-nine were deprived of their
abilities to perform significant functions like they did in Washington.183 That means
252 of them would still be performing significant duties akin to those that they were
in Washington.184 Of those 252 still performing significant responsibilities, thirty-
nine would be in Grand Junction, while 213 would be in other state and field offices.185
Functionally, this means that Washington remains as one of many headquarters,
rather than Grand Junction replacing Washington as the only one.
There are potentially statutory186 and/or constitutional difficulties187 with placing
the “headquarters” of higher-ranking offices outside of Washington. BLM is located
within the Department of the Interior.188 It is therefore unlikely to be considered to
have its own headquarters in the way that phrase has usually been understood, thereby
mitigating these constitutional and statutory concerns.189
179 See Carl Abbott, Dimensions of Regional Change in Washington, D.C., 95 AM. HIST.
REV. 1367, 1370 n.11 (1990).
180 See Darryl Fears, Trump’s Bid to Move Hundreds of Jobs from D.C., Possibly Separating









186 See An Act for Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of the Government of
the United States, ch. 28, Pub. L. No. 1-28, 1 Stat. 130 (1790). This statute refers to “the
permanent seat of the government” as being the District of Columbia. Id. § 1. It states that
“all offices attached to the said seat of government . . . shall be removed” to the District, and
their powers “shall . . . cease to be exercised elsewhere.” Id. § 6. Yet at the time that statute
was enacted, there were already many important officials operating outside of the District.
See Fontana, supra note 1, at 742–43.
187 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (mentioning “such District . . . as may . . . become
the Seat of the Government of the United States” (emphasis added)). Earlier objections to
relocating federal officials outside of Washington were based on this constitutional clause.
See Fontana, supra note 1, at 751. But see U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (mentioning
officials outside of Washington by referring to “all Places [needed] . . . for the Erection of
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings” (emphasis added)).
188 See Bureaus & Offices, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/bureaus [https://
perma.cc/NGV7-R49K] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
189 See Fontana, The Narrowing of Federal Power, supra note 17, at 737–38. It is worth
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BLM leaders placed in charge by the Trump administration identified only sixty
officials in all of BLM who benefitted substantially from being in Washington.190
There are certainly more officials than that benefitting from learning what other
agencies and departments are doing related to public lands, learning what is politi-
cally possible to do from those on Capitol Hill and in the White House, learning what
is desirable from think tanks, and learning about the private sector effects of this
from lobbyists. It is worth noting that over two billion dollars were spent lobbying
in some areas of environmental law between 2000 and 2016, most of it presumably
spent in Washington.191
The means by which Washington officials were relocated suggest that the goal
was not to mix their Washington expertise with subject-matter expertise, but simply
to remove them from BLM altogether.192 BLM officials were given thirty days to
decide whether to accept or reject their reassignment.193 Unless they accepted the re-
assignment, they would be terminated.194 Deciding whether to relocate one’s entire
personal and professional lives—particularly when those lives usually involve decades
in Washington—takes more than thirty days. At first, in return for agreeing to relocate,
officials were promised 25% of their base salaries and free temporary housing, but
those offers were subsequently rescinded.195 The result was that 87% of the affected
individuals in BLM opted to resign or retire than relocate outside of Washington.196
The cost of minimizing the influence of these officials is not matched by any of
the benefits that federal decentralization can provide. There are major metropolitan
areas in the Western United States that have public and private sectors with expertise
noting that the head of BLM is confirmed by the Senate, suggesting they are a “principal
officer.” See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. There is an open constitutional question whether that
is probative of BLM’s status for location purposes.
190 See Headquarters Move West, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/office/na
tional-office/hq-move-west [https://perma.cc/8NZA-ZB5K] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021)
(noting “[a]bout 60 positions from programs with inherently DC-based responsibilities”
would stay in Washington including those who worked on issues related to “legislative,
regulatory and public affairs, budget, and Freedom of Information Act compliance”).
191 See Robert J. Brulle, The Climate Lobby: A Sectoral Analysis of Lobbying Spending
on Climate Change in the USA, 2000 to 2016, 149 CLIMATIC CHANGE 289, 295 (2018).
192 The leading officials involved in this effort essentially confirmed this was the general
impetus for reforms like this. See Guarino, supra note 149.
193 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 177.
194 Id.
195 See Eric Katz, Interior Threatens to Relocate Employees Without Incentive Payments
If Congress Withholds Funding, GOV’T EXEC. (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.govexec.com
/workforce/2019/09/interior-threatens-relocate-employees-without-incentive-payments-if-con
gress-withholds-funding/160120/ [https://perma.cc/HE9E-BB9B].
196 Juliet Eilperin, Trump Officials Moved Most Bureau of Land Management Positions
out of D.C. More Than 87 Percent Quit Instead., WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2021, 6:24 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/01/28/trump-blm-reorganization/
[https://perma.cc/83J4-CPKY].
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in public lands management, but Grand Junction does not appear to be one of them.197
BLM was also already a part of the federal government with uniquely broad and
deep ties to communities outside of Washington.198 It did not just have offices out-
side of Washington, but twelve state offices, thirty-eight district offices, and 127
field offices.199 Because only 3% of its officials were in Washington,200 it did not have
a substantial presence in Washington at the top to ignore or overrule those located
outside of Washington.
A second effort at decentralization that was destructive was the relocation of two
different offices from the Department of Agriculture.201 The Trump administration
decided to relocate the Economic Research Service office (ERS) and the National
Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) within the Department of Agriculture to
the Kansas City metropolitan area.202
Like the BLM relocation, these efforts seemed to be targeted at eliminating existing
staff, rather than improving their performance or supplementing their performance
with a different type of environment. On June 13, 2019, officials in ERS were told they
had less than three months not only to agree to move to Kansas City, but to actually
move there—or else these officials would lose their jobs.203 As one official put it,
that meant she had “about two-and-a-half months to pull up [her] roots, get [her]
spouse a job, get [her] kids in school.”204 While that deadline was eventually slightly
extended,205 it did not matter. Only sixteen of the 181 officials that were told to
relocate stayed with ERS.206
These officials seemed particularly suited for Washington work. These offices
featured highly educated officials with substantial amounts of technical expertise in
analyzing the policy effects of different federal actions.207 That is a clear specialty of
197 See Jason Plautz, Can Grand Junction Save Itself by Becoming the Next Home for the
Bureau of Land Management, PAC. STANDARD (July 11, 2019), https://psmag.com/environ
ment/can-grand-junction-save-itself-by-becoming-the-next-home-for-the-bureau-of-land-man
agement [https://perma.cc/U3XB-UKAN] (providing an overview of the economic and political
situation in Grand Junction).
198 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 177.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See Merrit Kennedy, Scientists Desert USDA as Agency Relocates to Kansas City








207 See Kennedy, supra note 201.
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the labor market in Washington.208 Kansas City has no clear specialty in that domain
that would make it a superior place in which to recruit and retain talented workers.209
These relocations provide no clear benefit from the perspective of democratic
access. Instead of multiple new locations—like the BLM decentralization achieved—
there is now just one metropolitan area (again) that has all of these officials.210 And
rather than improving the independence of these offices, the decentralizations had the
opposite effect. One organization labeled these efforts a “back-door” attempt to elimi-
nate these staff because of their disagreement with the Trump administration on
many issues.211
C. Effects
In the shorter term, BLM, ERS, and NIFA will be substantially affected. Officials
in those offices with decades of knowledge about how the federal government operates
and how those offices operate within the federal government no longer work there.212
If a later presidential administration were to move these offices back to Washington,
they would either have to terminate the new officials hired in Colorado and Missouri
or secure funding to hire hundreds more officials so they could hire these old
officials back. All of this is assuming, of course, that these officials want to return.
Over the medium- to longer-term, these efforts by the Trump administration
unilaterally appropriated federal centralization by conservatives—or at least Presi-
dent Trump’s vision of conservatism. People inevitably evaluate messages by the
messengers telling them about those messages.213 There is no preexisting, broadly
and strongly developed sense among the public of federal decentralization.214 It is
not a principle like judicial supremacy, which is featured in high school textbooks.215
Draining the swamp was a highly salient message communicated by the President
208 See Fontana, The Narrowing of Federal Power, supra note 17, at 735.
209 See, e.g., QuickFacts: Washington City, District of Columbia; Kansas City City [sic],
Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/washington
citydistrictofcolumbia,kansascitycitymissouri/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/EAZ8-PVTP]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (noting that only 34% of people in Kansas City have a college
degree or higher education, compared to 58% in Washington).
210 See Kennedy, supra note 201.
211 USDA’s Proposed Relocation of ERS, NIFA an Insult to World-Class Researchers,
INST. AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y (May 3, 2019), https://www.iatp.org/documents/usdas-pro
posed-relocation-ers-nifa-insult-world-class-researchers [https://perma.cc/7SJP-DY77].
212 See generally Baptiste, supra note 176; Kennedy, supra note 201.
213 See Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements:
An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 611, 619–21 (2000).
214 See Fontana, supra note 1, at 732–33, 736–37.
215 See Tom Donnelly, Popular Constitutionalism, Civic Education, and the Stories We
Tell Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948, 982 (2009) (“Throughout our contemporary textbooks,
a moderate form of judicial supremacy often masquerades as judicial review.”).
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of the United States, affiliating a relatively unknown principle like federal decentral-
ization with a relatively widely known figure like Trump.216
Placing federal officials outside of Washington has a long and distinguished
history across both parties.217 The principle has been used by significant figures in
the Democratic Party in earlier periods of history.218 Democratic President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt relocated 10,000 federal officials outside of Washington to other
cities.219 A Democratic President that wants a Department of Labor more sympa-
thetic to organized labor might find the active labor community of Los Angeles a
more sympathetic home for a progressive labor agenda than Washington.220 New
York has been a leader in regulating climate change, so maybe Albany or New York
City would be a sympathetic home for an Environmental Protection Agency to
combat climate change in a Democratic administration.221
However, because federal decentralization is now so strongly associated with
the Trump administration, it increases the difficulties for a Democratic President to
pursue it. It is common for administrations to make constitutional arguments that
were opposed by their party—or themselves—in the previous administration.222 It
is just harder to do so if the previous President made provocative and public argu-
ments utilizing this principle. The Obama administration moved significant opera-
tions from the Department of Defense to Silicon Valley.223 If the next Democratic
administration tries to do something like that, will opponents of such actions parody
them by saying they are trying to drain the swamp?
The Trump administration’s efforts at federal decentralization not only unilater-
ally appropriated the idea, but also delegitimized it because of its crazed invocations
of it. The rhetoric of “Drain the Swamp” is the provocative frame by which people
were first informed of the idea.224 The idea of relocating ninety percent of federal
216 See Vogel & Lipton, supra note 153.
217 See Fontana, supra note 1, at 745–57 (discussing the constitutional history of this idea).
218 See id. at 749–52.
219 See President Shifts 10,000 Employes [sic] out of Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20,
1941), https://www.nytimes.com/1941/12/20/archives/president-shifts-10000-employes-out
-of-washington-dozen-bureaus.html [https://perma.cc/2UAS-QW83].
220 See Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defining Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1617, 1625 (2011); Curtis J. Simon & Clark Nardinelli, Human Capital and
the Rise of American Cities, 1900–1990, 32 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 59, 61 (2002).
221 See David Roberts, New York Just Passed the Most Ambitious Climate Target in the Coun-
try, VOX, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/6/20/18691058/new-york-green
-new-deal-climate-change-cuomo [https://perma.cc/DG7C-3MT6] (July 22, 2019, 8:56 AM).
222 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 51, at 485.
223 See Ash Carter, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Drell Lecture: “Rewiring the Pentagon: Charting
a New Path on Innovation and Cybersecurity” (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.defense.gov
/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606666/drell-lecturerewiring-the-pentagon-charting-a
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officials within six years is the provocative examples of what it would look like in
practice.225 The very nature of this principle, then, is thought to be “off the wall”226
because of the context in which people come to learn of the principle.
The assumption that the Trump administration was engaged in destructive federal
decentralization elicited a strongly partisan reaction by Democrats in Congress. Rep-
resentatives Ro Khanna (D-CA) and Tim Ryan (D-OH) had earlier in the admin-
istration indicated support for placing more important federal officials outside of
Washington.227 Once the Trump administration and its supporters started to act, a
very different Democratic Party response was generated. During hearings in the
House on the Drain the Swamp Act, Representative Gerald Connolly (D-VA) made
the unreasonable claim that the primary reason to decentralize federal officials was
to move them closer to cows.228
CONCLUSION
Even old constitutional ideas can have new meanings when new political figures
leverage these ideas for their own purposes. Federalism has been publicly affiliated
with the Republican Party for more than half a century, but federal decentralization
has been affiliated with neither party for even longer.229 It was a principle crucial to
understanding the Constitution, but little discussed by those leading the country.
That has all changed because of what has happened with three relatively obscure
offices within the executive branch.230 BLM, ERS, and NIFA are not acronyms that
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eral Government (Apr. 20, 2017), https://timryan.house.gov/press-release/congressman-tim
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have featured in constitutional conversations, but now they will be.231 The Trump
administration will be known for using the offices with these acronyms to decen-
tralize federal officials outside of Washington, and for owning federal decentraliza-
tion as a result. And our government—and our constitutional principles—are the
worse for it.
231 See Crampton, supra note 230; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 177.
